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Abstract A deontic STIT logic is studied in this paper with
the possible application of specifying security policies for
intrude detection in the pervasive computing environment.
Compared to the existing deontic STIT logics, an advan-
tage of our logic is that it is capable of solving the miners
paradox, a logical paradox which recently grabs attentions
of logicians, philosophers, linguistists and computer scien-
tists. A complete and sound axiomatization of our logic is
developed.
Keywords Deontic logic · Miners paradox · Security policy
1 Introduction
Our ultimate goal in this article is to develop a logic to for-
malize security policies, especially for intrude detection in
pervasive computing environments. Security is a high pri-
ority requirement for lots of information systems, and it is
considered in practice as a more and more significant issue.
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In most systems, security requirements may already exist
but usually remain informal, and starting from these require-
ments it is of growing interest to be able to define a rigorous
security policy.
In pervasive computing environments, resources like
information and services are accessible anywhere and any-
time via any devices (Barolli and Takizawa 2010;Marcelloni
et al. 2014; Ogiela et al. 2014; Ramos et al. 2014; Choi et al.
2014). There are different sorts of users and services, and
some of themmay be unknown or not predefined (Kagal et al.
2001). The distribution of resources in these environments
forces us to leverage decentralized security management.
In this setting, the environment is divided into a number of
domains based on different factors. For each domain, there
is a security agent with an administrator (we call it authority)
who is responsible for preserving the security of resources
that are under their protection.
Several authors have used deontic logic to specify secu-
rity policies (Glasgow et al. 1992; Jones and Sergot 1992;
Demolombe and Jones 1996; Cuppens-Boulahia and Cup-
pens 2008; Cuppens et al. 2013). These authors outlined the
main features of this formalism to analyze further various
aspects of security, to formalize previously informal secu-
rity requirements and to provide a flexible and expressive
language for specifying security properties. Deontic logic
is a formal study of norms and deontic modalities (such as
permission, forbidden and obligation). In 1951, the publi-
cation of von Wright (1951) indicates the birth of deontic
logic. With the work of Meyer (1988), deontic logic became
a part of computer science. Deontic logic has been a valuable
tool in the specification and reasoning of security policies
because key notions in security such as permission, autho-
rization, prohibition and obligation are exactly the subjects
of deontic logic. To apply deontic logic in the specification
of security policies in pervasive computing environments,
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we need a deontic logic in which different authorities are
explicitly modeled. Deontic STIT logic offers one option
for this purpose. Deontic STIT logic (Horty 2001; Kooi and
Tamminga 2008; Sun 2011; Broersen 2011), grounded on
STIT (see to it that) theory (Belnap et al. 2001), is a branch
of deontic logic developed by philosophers, logicians and
computer scientists in recent years. In Kooi and Tamminga
(2008) and Sun (2011), the authors develop deontic log-
ics which are capable of models commands from different
authorities.
Another reason for choosing deontic STIT logic comes
from the motivation of the specification of policies of
intrusion detection. Cuppens-Boulahia and Cuppens (2008)
investigate the specification of intrusion detection policies.
They argue that it is appropriate to use the bring it about
modality for specification. Since the difference between
bring it about and see to it that is negligible, deontic STIT
logic can be an appropriate tool to specify policies of intru-
sion detection.
From a logical perspective, one limitation of the existing
deontic STIT logic is that they are suffered from some logical
paradoxes. This paper develops a newmulti-authority deontic
STIT logic (MADL) to overcome this problem such that our
logic is more suitable for the application to security than the
existing deontic STIT logics.
In the rest of this paper, we recap the miners paradox in
Sect. 2 as a trigger of our further study. We then present our
deontic STIT logic in Sect. 3. In Sect. 4 we discuss some
related work. Section5 summarizes this article with future
work.
2 The miners paradox
In recent years, many deontic logicians get interested in the
miners paradox (Gabbay et al. 2014). The miners paradox
presented in Kolodny and MacFarlane (2010) is described
like this:
There are 10 miners trapped in either shaft A or shaft
B, but we don’t know which one. Water threatens to
flood the shafts. We have sandbags to block only one
shaft. If one shaft is blocked, all water will flood into
the other shaft, killing all miners inside. If we block
neither shaft, both will be flooded partially, killing 1
miner.
Since we don’t know the miners’ location, it seems plausible
that:
(1) We should block neither shaft A nor shaft B.
However, the following also seems acceptable.
(2) We should block shaft A if the miners are in shaft A.
(3) We should block shaft B if the miners are in shaft B.
(4) The miners are either in shaft A or in shaft B.
And (2), (3) together with (4) imply that
(5) Either we should block shaft A or we should block shaft
B.
Which contradicts to (1).
The deontic STIT logic proposed in Horty (2001), Kooi
and Tamminga (2008), Sun (2011) cannot solve this paradox:
Although the inference from (2)–(4) to (5) is not valid in the
logic introduced in Sun (2011), both Horty (2001) and Sun
(2011) are not capable of predicting (1). In this paper, we
develop MADL, which is able to block the inference from
(2)–(4) to (5) meanwhile predicts (1)–(4).
3 Deontic STIT logic
In deontic STIT logic, the semantics of deontic operator is
interpreted by best choices, which are defined via a prefer-
ence relation over sets of possible worlds. Such a relation is
characterized by a preference relation over possible worlds
through lifting. In the literature, there are many methods of
lifting preference, which are summarized by Lang and van
der Torre (2008) as follows:
– strong lifting: Let U1 and U2 be two sets of worlds, U1
is strongly at least as good as U2 iff ∀w ∈ U1, ∀v ∈ U2,
w is at least as good as v.
– optimistic lifting:U1 is optimistically at least as good as
U2 iff ∃w ∈ U1, ∀v ∈ U2, w is at least as good as v.
– pessimistic lifting:U1 pessimistically at least as good as
U2 iff ∀w ∈ U1, ∃v ∈ U2, w is at least as good as v.
In utilitarian deontic logic (UDL) of Horty (2001), Kooi
and Tamminga (2008), Sun (2011), strong lifting is used.
According to strong lifting, the best choices in the miners
paradox are block_A, block_B and block_neither. Therefore,
“we ought to block neither” is false. To have a more precise
understanding of such reasoning, we now formally review
the UDL introduced in Sun (2011).
The language of utilitarian deontic logic, Ludl , is defined
by the following BNF: Let Ψ = {p, q, r, . . .} be a set of
propositional atoms and Agent = {1, . . . , n} be a set of
agents,
ψ ::=p | ¬ψ | ψ ∧ ψ | ©Gψ | ©G(ψ/ψ) | [G]ψ
where p ∈ Ψ,G ⊆ Agent . Intuitively, [G]ψ says that
“group G sees to it that ψ .” ©Gψ says that “G ought to
see to it that ψ .” ©G(ψ/φ) says that “G ought to see to
it that ψ under the condition φ.” The semantics of UDL is
defined via the notion of utilitarian models.
123
Deontic STIT logic, from logical paradox to security policy
Definition 1 A utilitarian model (W, V,Choice,) is a
tuple where W is a set of possible worlds, V is a valua-
tion function that maps every atom to a set of worlds,  is a
transitive and reflexive relation over W , Choice is a choice
function. The function Choice : 2Agent 	→ 22W is based on
the individual choice function I ndChoice: Agent 	→ 22W .
I ndChoice is required to satisfy the following conditions:
(1) I ndChoice(i) forms a partition of W , for every i ∈
Agent ;
(2) given arbitrary x1 ∈ I ndChoice(1), . . . , xn ∈ I nd
Choice(n) and Agent = {1, . . . , n}, it holds that
x1 ∩ · · · ∩ xn = ∅;
A selection function τ : Agent 	→ 2W is a function such
that for all i ∈ Agent , it holds that τ(i) ∈ I ndChoice(i).
For H ⊆ Agent , if H = ∅, then we let Choice(H) =
{⋂ j∈H τ( j) : τ is a selection function}. If H = ∅, then
Choice(H) = {W }.
We use w  v to represent that w is no better than v and
w ≈ v as an abbreviation of w  v and v  w.
Definition 2 (Sun (2011)) For X,Y ⊆ W , X s Y iff
(1) there are u ∈ X and u′ ∈ Y such that u  u′.
(2) for every u ∈ X , for every u′ ∈ Y , u  u′.
X ≺s Y is used to denote X s Y meanwhile Y s X .
Definition 3 (Horty (2001)) Let H ⊆ Agent and T , T ′ ∈
Choice(H). T sH T ′ iff for all S ∈ Choice(Agent − H),
T ∩ S s T ′ ∩ S.
T sH T ′ means that “T ′ weakly dominates T .” From a
perspective of decision theory, T sH T ′ says that whatever
other agents do, the result obtained by choosing T ′ is no
worse than that of choosing T . T ≺sH T ′ is short for T sH
T ′ and T ′ sH T . If T ≺sH T ′, then we say T ′ strongly
dominates T .
Definition 4 (Horty (2001)) Let H be a set of agents and Y
a set of worlds.
Choice(H/Y ) = {T : T ∈ Choice(H) and T ∩ Y = ∅}
Intuitively, Choice(H/Y ) are those choices made by group
H which are consistent with Y .
Definition 5 (Sun (2011)) Let T , T ′ ∈ Choice(H/Y ).
T sH/Y T ′ iff for every S ∈ Choice((Agent − H)/






















Fig. 1 W = {v1, . . . , v6}, v3 ≈ v6  v1 ≈ v2  v4 ≈ v5
T sH/Y T ′ means that “T ′ weakly dominates T under the
condition of Y .” T ≺sH/Y T ′, read as “T ′ strongly dominates
T under the condition of Y ,” is short for T sH/Y T ′ and
T ′ sH/Y T .
Definition 6 (Horty (2001)) Let H be a set of agents,
– OptimalsH = {T ∈ Choice(H) : there is no T ′ ∈
Choice(H) such that T ≺sH T ′}.
– OptimalsH/Y = {T ∈ Choice(H/Y ) : there’s no T ′ ∈
Choice(H/Y ) such that T ≺sH/Y T ′}.
Definition 7 (Semantics of UDL). Given a utilitarian model
M = (W, V, choice,) and v ∈ W ,
M, v  p iff v ∈ V (p);
M, v  ¬ψ iff it does not hold that M, v  ψ;
M, v  ψ ∧ φ iff M, v  ψ and M, v  φ;
M, v  [H ]ψ iff M, v′  ψ, for all v′ ∈ W satisfying
that there is T ∈ Choice(H)
such that {v, v′} ⊆ T ;
M, v  ©Hψ iff T ⊆ ||ψ || for every T ∈ OptimalsH ;
M, v  ©H (ψ/φ) iff T ⊆ ||ψ || for every T ∈ OptimalsH/φ.
Here ‖ψ‖ = {v ∈ W : M, v  ψ}.
The miners paradox is characterized by a model Miners
= (W, V,Choice,), W = {v1, . . . , v6}, Choice(H) =
{{v1, v2}, {v3, v4}, {v5, v6}}, Choice(Agent − H) = {W },
v3 ≈ v6  v1 ≈ v2  v4 ≈ v5, V (in_A) = {v1, v3, v5},
V (in_B) = {v2, v4, v6}, V (block_A) = {v5, v6},
V (block_B) = {v3, v4}, V (block_neither) = {v1, v2}
(Fig. 1).
Group H can choose block_A, block_B or block_neither,
while other agents can only choose W . All the three choices
of group H are optimal by the strong lifting. Therefore,
Miners, v1  ©H (block_neither). Therefore, UDL cannot
solve the miners paradox.
3.1 Utilitarian deontic logic via pessimistic lifting
With the motivation of solving the miners paradox, we intro-
duce a new logic called pessimistic utilitarian deontic logic
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(PUDL), in which pessimistic lifting is used instead of strong
lifting. We will show that PUDL not only solves the miners
paradox but also solves Ross’s paradox and the contrary to
duty paradox. We then present an axiomatization for PUDL
and generalize PUDL to MADL in the next subsection.
Informally, block_neither in the miners scenario is the
only optimal choice according to the pessimistic lifting.
Hence, “we ought to block neither” holds. Moreover, in
PUDL both (2) and (3) are true, whereas the inference from
(2)-(4) to (5) is invalid. Therefore, PUDL is capable of solv-
ing the miners paradox. Now, we present these arguments
formally.
3.1.1 Language
The language Lpudl is generated by the following BNF:
ψ ::= p | ¬ψ | ψ ∧ ψ | [i]ψ | []ψ | [≺]ψ | []ψ | ψ
Intuitively, [i]ψ means that “agent i sees to it that ψ .” ψ
says that “ψ is true everywhere.” []ψ express “ψ is weakly
preferable” while [≺]ψ states that “ψ is strictly preferable.”
[]ψ means that “ψ is unpreferable.” 〈〉, 〈≺〉 and ♦ are
dual for [], [≺] and , respectively. The relation  must
be reflexive, transitive and total, while ≺ must satisfy that
v ≺ w iff v  w and w  v. Pessimistic lifting is defined in
Lpudl as follows:
– pessimistic lifting: ψ p φ::=(φ ⇒ 〈〉ψ). Infor-
mally, the formula(φ ⇒ 〈〉φ) says that everyφ-world
is weakly better than some ψ-world.
We use ψ ≺p φ to denote ¬(φ p ψ) ∧ (ψ p φ).
Obligation in Lpudl is characterized as follows:
– ©iψ ::=(¬ψ ≺p [i]ψ) ∧ ♦[i]ψ . That is to say, agent i
ought to STIT ψ if and only if in the pessimistic sense
STIT ψ is strictly better than ¬ψ and it is possible for i
to STIT ψ .
– ©i (ψ/φ)::=♦[i]ψ ∧ ((¬ψ ∧ φ) ≺p ([i]φ ∧ ψ)).
3.1.2 Semantics
We now introduce the semantics of PUDL.
Definition 8 A tuple M = (W,,≺, I ndChoice, V ) is a
pessimistic utilitarian model if W and I ndChoice are the
same as in the utilitarian model,  is a relation over W that
represents the social welfare of all agents,  is reflexive,
transitive and connected.1 ≺ is a relation over W such that
for every v, v′ ∈ W , v ≺ v′ iff v′  v meanwhile v  v′.
1  is connected if for all v, v′ ∈ W , either v  v′, or v′  v.
Let Ri be a relation such that (v, v′) ∈ Ri if and only if there
exists a T ∈ I ndChoice(i) with {v, v′} ⊆ T . The semantics
of Lpudl is defined as follows:
Definition 9 Given a pessimistic utilitarian model M and
v ∈ W ,
M, v pudl [i]ψ iff M, u  ψ for every u with (v, u) ∈ Ri ;
M, v pudl []ψ iff M, u  ψ for every u with v  u;
M, v pudl []ψ iff M, u  ψ for every u with u  v;
M, v pudl [≺]ψ iff M, u  ψ for every u with v ≺ u;
M, v pudl ψ iff M, u  ψ for every u ∈ W.
3.1.3 Solving the miners paradox
We formally describe the miners scenario by a pessimistic
utilitarian model. Let Miners p = (W, I ndChoice,,≺,
V ) such that W = {v1, . . . , v6}, I ndChoice(i) = {{v1, v2},
{v3, v4}, {v5, v6}}, I ndChoice( j) = {W } for all j = i ,
v3 ≈ v6 ≺ v1 ≈ v2 ≺ v4 ≈ v5, V (in_A) =
{v1, v3, v5},V (in_B) = {v2, v4, v6},V (block_A) = {v5, v6},
V (block_B) = {v3, v4}, V (block_neither) = {v1, v2}.
We know that ¬block_neither is strictly worse than
[i]block_neither according to the pessimistic semantics.
Therefore, Miners p, v1  ©i (block_neither). Moreover,
we have “if the miners are in A, then i ought to block
A” because ¬block_A is worse than [i]block_A, given the
condition of miners being in A. Therefore, Miners p, v1 
©i (block_A/ in_A). Similarly Miners p, v1  ©i
(block_B/ in_B). It remains to prove that even if “if the min-
ers are in A, then we ought to block A” and “if the miners
are in B, then we ought to block B” are both true, we do not
infer that “we ought to block either A or B.” The following
proposition justifies such reasoning.
Proposition 1 pudl ©i (φ/ψ)∧©i (φ/χ) ⇒ ©i (φ/(ψ ∨
χ)).
3.1.4 Bonus 1: solving the contrary to duty paradox
The contrary to duty paradox is one of the most serious
paradoxes in deontic logic. The best known example of this
paradox is give by Chisholm (1963):
(1a) It ought to be that you go to the party;
(2a) It ought to be that if you go, then you tell them you are
going;
(3a) If you don’t go, you ought not to tell themyou are going;
(4a) You do not go.
Intuitively, these four statements are consistent and inde-
pendent of each other. But either the consistency or the
independency is lost after they are translated to standard
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Fig. 2 Contrary to duty
paradox
v2 : ¬p,¬qv1 : ¬p, q v3 : p,¬q v4 : p, q≺ ≺ ≺
deontic logic. In our logic, fortunately, we survive form such
predicament.
Let p represent “go to the party.” Letq represent “tell them
you are going.” Then, we can formalize the four statements
using our logic in the following way:
(a) ©i p
(b) ©i (p ⇒ q)
(c) ©i (¬q/¬p)
(d) ¬p
It’s not hard to see that the above four formulas are inde-
pendent of each other. For consistency, consult the following
example.
Example 1 Let M = (W, V, I ndChoice,,≺), W =
{v1, . . . , v4}, I ndChoice(i) = {{v1}, {v2}, {v3}, {v4}}, v1 ≺
v2 ≺ v3 ≺ v4. V (p) = {v3, v4}, V (q) = {v1, v4}. See Fig. 2.
In this model, we have all the four formulas (a)− (d) are all
true in v1.
3.1.5 Bonus 2: solving Ross’ paradox
Another well-known paradox in deontic logic is Ross’ para-
dox Alfred (1941):
Suppose John should send a letter. Since sending the
letter implies sending it or burning it, John should send
the letter or burn it.
In UDL, the formula ©Hφ ⇒ ©H (φ ∨ ψ) is valid, which
means UDL cannot solve Ross’ paradox. On the other hand,
PUDL solves Ross’ paradox, as the following proposition
shows.
Proposition 2 pudl ©iφ ⇒ ©i (φ ∨ ψ).
3.1.6 Axiomatization of PUDL
The axiomatic system of PUDL contains the rules necessita-
tion for , [], [], [≺], [1], . . . , [n], modus pones, and the
following axioms:
1. Mutual converse for [] and []:
(ψ ⇒ []〈〉ψ) ∧ (ψ ⇒ []〈〉ψ).
2. S4.3 for []:
(a) [](ψ ⇒ φ) ⇒ ([]ψ ⇒ []φ);
(b) []ψ ⇒ [][]ψ ;
(c) []ψ ⇒ ψ ;
(d) 〈〉φ ∧ 〈〉ψ ⇒ (〈〉(ψ ∧ 〈〉φ) ∨ 〈〉(φ ∧ 〈
〉ψ) ∨ 〈〉(ψ ∧ φ)).
3. K for [≺]:
[≺](ψ ⇒ φ) ⇒ ([≺]ψ ⇒ [≺]φ).
4. Interaction:
(a) [≺]ψ ⇒ [][≺]ψ ;
(b) [≺]ψ ⇒ [≺][]ψ ;
(c) []([]ψ ∨ φ) ∧ [≺]φ ⇒ ψ ∨ []φ.
5. Inclusion:
(a) ψ ⇒ []ψ ;
(b) []ψ ⇒ [≺]ψ ;
(c) for i ∈ Agent , ψ ⇒ [i]ψ .
6. Agent independent: (♦[1]ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ♦[n]ψn) ⇒
♦([1]ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ [n]ψn).
7. S5 for .
8. S5 for [i], i ∈ Agent .
If ψ can be deduced from the above axiomatic system
( pudl ψ), then ψ is a theorem of PUDL. We say ψ is
deducible fromΓ (Γ pudl ψ), whereΓ is a set of formulas,
if pudl ψ or there are formulas φ1, . . . , φn ∈ Γ such that
pudl (φ1 ∧ · · · ∧ φn) ⇒ ψ .
Theorem 1 Γ pudl ψ iff Γ pudl ψ
The completeness (right-to-left) can be proved by using
a canonical model technique together with Bulldozing
(Segerberg 1971), and both are standard technique in modal
logic. The proof of soundness (left-to-right) is trivial.
3.2 Multi-authority deontic STIT logic
Now we generalize PUDL to MADL. The main difference
between them is that in MADL, deontic modality is inter-
preted via multiple authorities.
3.2.1 Language
The language of MADL is constructed from Agent , Ψ , a set
of authorities Auth, a set of objects Obj and a set of atomic
action Act . For i ∈ Agent , o ∈ Obj and a ∈ Act , do(i, a, o)
is an atomic formula,whichmeans agent i execute actiona on
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object o. For atomic formulas p, q, i ∈ Agent and j ∈ Auth,
the language Lmadl is generated by the following BNF:
ψ ::=p | ¬ψ | ψ ∧ ψ | [i]ψ | ψ | [ j ]ψ
| [ j ]ψ | [≺ j ]ψ
Intuitively, [ j ]ψ means that “ψ is weakly preferable
according to the normative standard of authority j ,” while
[≺ j ]ψ means “ψ is strictly preferable according to the
normative standard of authority j .” [ j ]ψ means “ψ is
unpreferable according to the normative standard of authority
j .”We useψ ≺ j φ as an abbreviation of (ψ  j φ)∧¬(φ  j
ψ). Obligation is expressed in Lmadl as follows:
– © ji ψ ::=(¬ψ ≺ j [i]ψ)∧♦[i]ψ . Intuitively, this formula
means that agent i ought to see to it that ψ according to
the normative value of authority j iff¬ψ is strictly worse
than seeing to it that ψ according to the normative value
of authority j and it is possible for i to see to it that ψ .
– © ji (ψ/φ)::=((¬ψ ∧ φ) ≺ j ([i]ψ ∧ φ)) ∧ ♦[i]ψ .
To specify security policies, we further introduce (condi-
tional) prohibition and (conditional) permission in Lmadl :
– F ji ψ ::=© ji ¬ψ . This means according to the normative
value of authority j , agent i is forbidden to STIT ψ iff i
is obliged to STIT ¬ψ .
– F ji (ψ/φ)::= © ji (¬ψ/φ).
– P ji ψ ::=¬F ji ψ . This means according to the normative
value of authority j , agent i is permitted to see to it that
ψ iff i is not forbidden to see to it that ψ .
– P ji (ψ/φ)::=¬F ji (ψ/φ).
3.2.2 Semantics
The semantics of MADL is based on multi-authority STIT
model, which is a generalization of PUDL model.
Definition 10 (Multi-authority STIT model) A Multi-
authority STIT model M = (W, I ndChoice,1,≺1, . . . ,
m,≺m, V ) is a tuple whereW and I ndChoice are the same
as in PUDL model, and  j is a relation on W indicating the
normative standard of authority j . j is required to be reflex-
ive, transitive and connected. ≺ j is a sub-relation of  j such
that for all v, v′ ∈ W , v ≺ j v′ iff v  j v′ and v′  j v.
The semantics of Lmddl is defined similarly to that of
PUDL; here, we only give the crucial cases:
Definition 11 Let M be a multi-authority STIT model, v ∈
W .
M, v madl [ j ]ψ iff M, u madl ψ for all w such that v  j u;
M, v madl [ j ]ψ iff M, u madl ψ for all u such that u  j v;
M, v madl [≺ j ]ψ iff M, u madl ψ for all u such that v ≺ j u;
3.2.3 Axiomatization of MADL
The axiomatic system of MADL is obtained by a simply
modification of the proof system of PUDL: Simply replace
the occurrence of [], [] and [≺] by [ j ], [ j ] and [≺ j ]
for each j ∈ Auth.
Theorem 2 (Soundness and completeness) Γ madl ψ iff
Γ madl ψ .
4 Related work
Using logics to handle the problems of specifying and rea-
soning about the security of information systems started
from 1988 by Glasgow and MacEwen (1988). Since then,
various types of logic have been used to model inference
abilities and specification of security policies. Van Her-
tum et al. (2016) have recently proposed a multi-agent
variant of autoepistemic logic, called Distributed Autoepis-
temic Logic with Inductive Definitions (dAEL(ID)), to be
used as a says-based access control logic. By applying the
semantic principles of autoepistemic logic to characterize
the says-modality, dAEL(ID) allows us to derive a state-
ment of the form says¬kψ on the basis of the observation
that k has not issued statements implying ψ . Support-
ing reasoning about such negated says-statements allows
dAEL(ID) to straightforwardly model access denials, which
can hardly bemodeled by previous says-based access control
logics.
5 Summary and future work
In this article, we have developed a deontic STIT logic with
the possible application to the specification of security policy
for intrude detection in the pervasive computing environ-
ment. Compared to the existing deontic STIT logics, an
advantage of our logic is that it is capable of solving the min-
ers paradox, a logical paradoxwhich recently grabs attentions
of logicians, philosophers, linguistists and computer scien-
tists. A complete and sound axiomatization for our logic was
developed. Concerning future works, we will study the com-
putational complexity of our logic and perform some case
study for the application of our logic to security policies.
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